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One of the major challenges faced by explanations of imitation is the “correspondence
problem”: how is an agent able to match its bodily expression to the observed
bodily expression of another agent, especially when there is no possibility of external
self-observation? Current theories only consider the possibility of an innate or acquired
matching mechanism belonging to an isolated individual. In this paper we evaluate an
alternative that situates the explanation of imitation in the inter-individual dynamics of the
interaction process itself. We implemented a minimal model of two interacting agents
based on a recent psychological study of imitative behavior during minimalist perceptual
crossing. The agents cannot sense the configuration of their own body, and do not have
access to other’s body configuration, either. And yet surprisingly they are still capable of
converging on matching bodily configurations. Analysis revealed that the agents solved
this version of the correspondence problem in terms of collective properties of the
interaction process. Contrary to the assumption that such properties merely serve as
external input or scaffolding for individual mechanisms, it was found that the behavioral
dynamics were distributed across the model as a whole.
Keywords: social cognition, interaction studies, evolutionary robotics, dynamical systems theory
INTRODUCTION
The study of imitative behavior is a central topic in developmen-
tal and comparative psychology, as well as in social neuroscience
(Heyes, 2009). It is widely accepted that imitation plays a signif-
icant role in human social learning and enculturation, and that
it serves as a cultural inheritance mechanism for human-specific
cumulative cultural evolution (Tomasello, 2001). Imitation is a
broad concept, but in current research it is often narrowly defined
as the intentional behavioral matching of the precise means of a
perceived action in order to achieve the same end.
One important challenge for a neuroscientific theory of imi-
tation is to account for what is known as the “perceptual-motor
translation problem” (Heyes, 2001) or the “correspondence prob-
lem” (Brass and Heyes, 2005): how can one agent’s perception
of another agent’s behavior constrain its own internal motor sys-
tem so as to produce a imitative behavior? The difficulty of such
behavioral matching partly derives from the fact that we cannot
directly perceive the other’s internal motor configuration but only
their behavioral expression. We can perceive that a person is per-
forming an action, for instance that she is wiggling her ears, but
not how that action is initiated.
In addition, in some situations we cannot perceive the bodily
expression of our own actions, and so it is impossible to employ
self-observation in order to monitor whether a match has been
achieved (e.g., imitation of a facial expression). We normally do
not worry about this fact. As adults we have already accumulated
an extensive repertoire of implicit bodily know-how, i.e., a “body
schema,” and we have acquired an intuitive appreciation of how
our body is perceived externally, i.e., a “body image” (Gallagher,
2005). However, neonates have never seen their own face, and
have little experience of other faces, so how can they imitate arbi-
trary facial gestures that are unlikely to be innate reflexes? We will
refer to this particular problem of neonatal facial imitation as the
“strong correspondence problem.” Meltzoff and Decety (2003)
have called this the “holy grail” of imitation research.
Infants can see the adult’s face but can not see their own faces.
They can feel their own faces move, but have no access to the feel-
ings of movement in the other. If they are young enough they will
have never seen their own face. There are nomirrors in the womb.
The holy grail for cognitive- and neuro-science theories of imita-
tion is to elucidate the mechanism by which infants connect the
felt but unseen movements of the self with the seen but unfelt
movements of the other. (Meltzoff and Decety, 2003, 491).
Heyes and Bird (2007) categorize solutions to the correspon-
dence problem along two dimensions regarding (1) the origins
of the mechanism, and (2) the functioning of the mechanism.
In terms of (1) the central debate is about the role of evolu-
tion by natural selection versus lifetime learning, and in terms
of (2) the main question is whether the imitation mechanism
is primarily based on lower-level sensorimotor embodiment or
if it also requires “higher-level” conceptual mediation. During
the cognitivist revolution in the 1970s, one popular theory of
imitation proposed an innate mechanism that is representa-
tionally mediated by higher-level cognition. This proposal was
inspired by prominent evidence that human neonates can spon-
taneously imitate different arbitrary facial gestures (Meltzoff
and Moore, 1977). Although versions of this kind of “innate”
and “top-down” theory continue to persist in the literature
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(e.g., Meltzoff and Moore, 1997; Csibra, 2007), they are now in
the minority. This change in outlook was prompted by a reassess-
ment of the evidence for neonatal imitation (Jones, 2009; Ray
and Heyes, 2011), and especially by the influential discovery of
“mirror neurons” (Gallese et al., 1996). Thus, recent theories
emphasize “lower-level” sensorimotor neural mechanisms, and
they also appeal to the essential role of lifetime modifications
of neural organization resulting from learning (e.g., Keysers and
Perrett, 2004; Heyes, 2005; Rizzolatti, 2005; Hurley, 2008).
TOWARD AN INTERACTIVE THEORY OF IMITATION
We agree with the general trend of these developments. However,
we suggest that the debate about imitation could further bene-
fit from considering the role of interaction in meaningful social
contexts as another relevant explanatory factor. In other words,
we propose to expand the analysis of Heyes and Bird (2007) with
another dimension along which to categorize theories of imita-
tion, namely the location of the mechanism underlying imitation.
In contrast to the prevalent internalist theories, there is also the
possibility of a relational theory of imitation that is focused on the
constitutive role of social interaction (Lenay and Stewart, 2012).
So far relational approaches have not received much attention in
the general debate about social cognition.
Most of social neuroscience has proceeded under the assump-
tion that an isolated individual is the sufficient explanatory unit
of analysis to account for social cognition, thereby focusing on
their “social brain” (Frith and Frith, 2010). This assumption is
sometimes referred to as methodological individualism (Boden,
2006). One important reason for the popularity of this internalist
approach is that an isolated brain is much easier to study. Activity
that is internal to the individual agent can be better located,
measured, and made visible through imaging technologies, and
this kind of social neuroscience has indeed been highly success-
ful (Adolphs, 2010). However, there is also increasing interest
in establishing a “second-person neuroscience” (Schilbach et al.,
forthcoming). One motivation for this change in perspective is
the idea that the neural processes that are constitutive of detached
and passive social observation may be different from the neu-
ral processes that are constitutive of immediate and active social
engagement with others. Another motivation is the idea that the
latter processes may not be limited to one individual alone; per-
haps they derive from, and are maybe even constituted by, social
interaction with other individuals1.
However, relational accounts of social cognition are con-
fronted by conceptual and methodological challenges because it
is difficult to capture social engagement “in the act.” Nevertheless,
progress has been made in the study of interaction dynamics,
1These ideas resonate with a number of other alternative traditions. In
developmental psychology there is research of primary and secondary inter-
subjectivity (Reddy and Morris, 2004; Trevarthen, 2005). In philosophy of
cognitive science there are phenomenological approaches to embodied inter-
subjectivity (e.g., Gallagher, 2001; Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). There is
the enactive approach to social cognition, which draws inspiration from a
dynamical perspective, and which takes social interaction as its starting point
(e.g., De Jaegher et al., 2010). These approaches are starting to form one
coherent framework of research in social interaction (Froese and Gallagher,
forthcoming).
especially by keeping the complexity of the social situation to an
absolute minimum (e.g., Auvray et al., 2009; Lenay et al., 2011).
This reduction of complexity has been aided by the design of min-
imal human-computer interfaces with the goal of enabling the
systematic study of behavior under highly controlled conditions.
We highlight two advantages of this method. First, much of the
exploratory activity of perception is usually hidden from view,
but by mediating this activity through a suitable interface it can
be made visible in terms of the participant’s behavior (Lenay and
Steiner, 2010). Second, by reducing the range of possible actions
and sensations to an absolute minimum, we can investigate what
are the necessary and sufficient conditions of a behavior.
This kind of minimalist approach has been applied to the case
of mimicry of bodily expression by Lenay and Stewart (2012; this
issue, experiment 3). Briefly, in this study of “mimetic dynamics
in the perceptual crossing,” two adult participants interact with
each other in a 1D virtual environment via custom-built human-
computer interfaces in order to mimic the bodily configurations
of their virtual avatars, although by design they cannot know
the specific configurations. Despite this extreme poverty of the
stimulus, participants were successful at matching their configu-
rations. An analysis of the results revealed that participants were
sensitive to the collective properties of the interaction process,
and adapted their bodily configuration accordingly. This sup-
ports an interactive account of solving the strong correspondence
problem.
The significance of these findings for the debate about current
theories of imitation is that social situations, which to an exter-
nal observer exhibit forms of mimicry, do not necessarily require
the postulation of individual (innate or acquired) mechanisms
and intentions for imitation. This is because the experiment has
shown that mimicry can also be an emergent outcome of certain
kinds of social interaction. According to this interactive account
of imitation, it is conceivable that a sense of mutual agreement in
interaction grounds and precedes an explicit awareness about the
bodily basis for that agreement (i.e., social understanding is pri-
mary, reflection about the fact that there is a matching of bodily
expressions is secondary). Lenay and Stewart therefore propose
that the classical logic of neonatal imitation could be inverted:
mimicry spontaneously results from the mutual regulation of col-
lective interaction dynamics, and it is this social interaction which
provides the newborn with the motivation and means for linking
her perception of the other with her proprioceptive sensations. It
is only later in development that the child will discover that what
she is doing during these situations is in fact an imitation or a
matching of bodily expressions.
Not everyone will be convinced by the findings of this exper-
iment. We highlight three potential concerns. It could be argued
that the experiment has no direct implications for neonatal facial
imitation (or imitation among non-human primates), because
(1) it has not yet been demonstrated that the result is generalizable
beyond the conditions of the experimental setup. More specifi-
cally, (2) it is possible that task success depends on sophisticated
cognitive capacities that are only available to enculturated adult
human beings. And (3) even if it is conceded that some collec-
tive properties of the interaction process play a role in shaping
the solution, it could still be claimed that these properties only
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serve as additional input or external “scaffolding” for cognitive
mechanisms that are ultimately isolated within an individual
agent (e.g., Herschbach, 2012; Michael and Overgaard, 2012).
MODELING SOCIAL INTERACTION
In order to respond to these potential criticisms, we applied an
evolutionary robotics approach to Lenay and Stewart’s (2012)
experimental setup. In brief, evolutionary robotics is a synthetic
method in which the experimenter designs and implements a
task-environment of interest, specifies the embodiment of one or
more robotic agents, and formulates a procedure for evaluating
behavioral success (Harvey et al., 2005). The neural controller
of an agent is simply a generic dynamical system, which is then
optimized automatically according to the evaluation function,
typically by means of an evolutionary algorithm. Although some
researchers prefer to use physical robots, much work is based on
computer models of “minimal cognition” (e.g., Beer, 2003).
There are several advantages to using this method. In contrast
to actual psychological experiments and realistic neural models,
the experimenter can reduce the complexity to a bare minimum
in order to enable a holistic understanding of the mechanisms
underlying the behavior. All parameters and variables of the
brain-body-environment system aremeasurable and controllable,
which allows a detailed and systematic study of how behavior
emerges out of the interplay between various subsystems. In con-
trast to the fully pre-designed systems familiar from traditional
AI, the experimenter is prevented from overly biasing the realiza-
tion of the behavioral mechanism, which is instead the outcome
of an opportunistic evolutionary process.
This synthetic method has been used to show that in some
cases the mechanisms of social interaction can be distributed
across two or more agents (e.g., Di Paolo, 2000; Quinn et al.,
2003). Some studies are directly inspired by psychological experi-
ments, for exampleMurray and Trevarthen (1985) “double video”
paradigm (e.g., Ikegami and Iizuka, 2007; Di Paolo et al., 2008;
Froese and Di Paolo, 2008). In particular, minimalist psycholog-
ical experiments make suitable modeling targets (e.g., Di Paolo
et al., 2008; Froese and Di Paolo, 2010, 2011). Of course, these
results do not have the same status as empirical data, but they
function as intuition pumps and thought experiments (Di Paolo
et al., 2000). They help us to refine existing theories, provide proof
of concepts, and generate new insights that can lead to further
psychological experiments (Rohde, 2010).
By using evolutionary robotics to implement a model of Lenay
and Stewart’s study of mimicry, we respond to the potential criti-
cisms as follows. Regarding (1) the problem of generalization we
show that the essential results of the psychological experiment
can be replicated in a different medium, in this case a mini-
mal dynamical system. This also mitigates (2) the worry about
requiring sophisticated cognition, because the simulated agents
are governed by “brains” that are far too minimal to contain
any sophisticated cognitive mechanisms. Therefore, any real brain
will have sufficient complexity to realize the dynamics found in
the artificial neural network. In response to (3) the possibility
of explanations based on methodological individualism, we clar-
ify the relationship between the internal dynamics, individual
behavior, and the interaction process as a whole. We show that
these components cannot be clearly separated.More generally, the
analysis of the model sheds new light on the interpretation of the
empirical data, and it allows us to propose new hypotheses that
can be tested by further psychological experiments.
METHODS
AMINIMAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT OF IMITATION
In order to evaluate the possibility of an interactive explanation
of imitation, Lenay and Stewart (2012) created a modified ver-
sion of the minimal technological setup that was used by Auvray
et al. (2009) for a related psychological study of social interac-
tion. Lenay and Stewart tried to recreate the essential elements of
the strong correspondence problem of neonatal facial imitation
for adult participants in a minimal virtual environment. They
designed a new human-computer interface through which two
adult human participants can explore a 1D circular virtual space
and interact with each other. The interface consists of a tactile
feedback device, which provides an all-or-nothing stimulus to a
participant’s finger, and a computer mouse by which participants
can alter their position in the virtual space. Both participants
are represented in the virtual space in a twofold manner, namely
as a “body-object” (BO) and as a “receptor field” (RF). Loosely
speaking, the BO represents a participant’s body as the other per-
ceives it, and the RF represents a participant’s subjective gaze,
which the other cannot directly perceive. All RFs and BOs have
the same length. The experimental setup is shown schematically
in Figure 1.
The movements of a participant’s BO and RF are linked by
a rigid connection, which is initialized at the start of a trial to
a random relative distance that is unknown to the participants.
This distance is referred to as D1 for participant P1 and D2 for
the other participant P2; its algebraic value is negative if a BO is
to the left of its RF, and positive if it is on the right-hand side
FIGURE 1 | Schematic of the experimental setup. Two participants
(P1 and P2) face each other in a 1D virtual environment (horizontal line).
Participants cannot see the overall status of the environment. By using a
computer mouse they can move their receptor field (RF) to detect the
presence of the other’s “body-object” (BO). They only receive tactile
feedback as long as their RF overlaps the other’s BO. The movement of a
participant’s BO and RF are connected by a rigid link. Link distance D is
measured as the relative position of a BO in relation to its RF (in this case
D1 < 0 and D2 > 0). At the start of a trial each D is initialized to a different
length that is unknown to the participants. Participants can adjust their D by
shifting the BO’s egocentric position left- and right-wards by left- and
right-clicking, respectively. As shown in the figure, a situation of “mimicry”
occurs when participants have complementary configurations (i.e.,
D1 = −D2). Since participants are unaware of their own bodily configuration
and that of the other, achieving this mimicry models the essential elements
of the strong correspondence problem of neonatal facial imitation.
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(calculated from allocentric coordinates). Direct knowledge of the
situation is reduced to an absolute minimum: a participant only
receives tactile stimulation as long as her RF overlaps the BO of
the other participant, and no feedback otherwise. Accordingly,
this minimalist setup takes the traditional “poverty of the stimu-
lus argument” (Ray and Heyes, 2011), which had been employed
to argue for an innate mechanism, to the extreme. Traditionally,
it was widely held that neonatal imitation could not be based
on learning or interaction, because there is insufficient time and
information for the infants to acquire the relevant expertise. The
current setup takes an even stricter minimalism as its starting
point, while at the same time also excluding the possibility of
accounting for behavioral success in terms of specialized genetic
factors (since we did not evolve to match virtual avatars).
Participants are capable of two kinds of action. They can use
the computer mouse to move their virtual body position left and
right along the 1D virtual environment. And they can also click
the left and right button of the mouse to shift the position of their
BO leftward and rightward, respectively (from an egocentric per-
spective around their RF). The task given to each participant is to
locate the other in the virtual space, and to interact with the other
by moving back and forth. They are also told that if they sense
that the interaction process exhibits a general tendency to drift to
the right they should click on the left-button, and vice versa. This
is because sideways drift is an indication of a mismatch between
their bodily configurations.
For instance, in the case of D1 + D2 < 0, if the RF1 over-
laps the BO2, P2 will have to move to its right to find BO1; but
then P1 will have to move to its left to recover BO2 once again,
and so on, resulting in a collective drift of both participants in
the same allocentric direction. From their egocentric perspective,
P1 will experience this drift as going leftward, and P2 will expe-
rience it in a rightward direction, so P1 will tend to right-click
and P2 will tend to left-click. Accordingly, they combine their
efforts at reducing the relative difference between their bodily
configurations.
This experimental setup may seem to be so minimal and arti-
ficial that it is difficult to relate it to the strong correspondence
problem. However, it is a virtue of this kind of approach that
the minimalist sensorimotor interface forces the perceptual activ-
ity of the participants to become visible in their interactions,
thereby enabling a detailed study of their dynamics (Lenay and
Steiner, 2010). The artificial setting also allows explicit control
over various features of the situation. In particular, participants
have no access to either of the two bodily configurations (i.e.,
neither D1 nor D2). It follows that in this study the emergence
of mimicry cannot be explained by (1) intra-modal mapping,
i.e., comparing external perception of the other’s body config-
uration with external self-monitoring of one’s own body con-
figuration, nor by (2) inter-modal mapping, i.e., by comparing
external perception of the other’s body configuration with inter-
nal self-observation (Meltzoff andMoore, 1997). Both innate and
acquired inter-modal mapping is excluded by design. The impor-
tant point is that if participants can still manage to achieve a
situation of mimicry (i.e., D1 = −D2) under these restricted con-
ditions, this result cannot be explained by any of the traditional
accounts.
Given this experimental setup, it was found by Lenay and
Stewart that participants are generally able to solve this version
of the correspondence problem successfully. The results demon-
strate that participants are able to interact so as to adjust their
bodily configuration in a complementary manner. Their respec-
tive links are finally matched in relative distance, even though
at no point do they explicitly know their own bodily configu-
ration nor that of the other. Instead, they somehow managed
to achieve this mutual mimicry on the basis of interacting with
each other in a rhythmic, oscillatory fashion. Behavior was not
always highly synchronized; in some cases there was role-taking
whereby one participant took the lead in moving and/or clicking.
Analysis of the experimental results indicated that participants
succeed in matching their bodies by responding to the relative
stability of the interaction process, because, as described above,
mismatches in relative bodily configuration introduce systematic
sideward drifts into the flow of the interaction. This drift cannot
be reduced to actions of one of the participants; on the contrary,
both participants are subjected to this drift, which emerges out of
their interaction. Mimicry was therefore enabled by a collective
property of the interaction process as a whole.
A MINIMAL MODELING EXPERIMENT OF IMITATION
The essential features of Lenay and Stewart’s psychological exper-
iment are retained in the model. Two simulated agents interact via
a 1D virtual space, in which they are each embodied as a RF that
is rigidly linked with a BO. The only important difference to the
original experiment is that two minimal artificial neural network
controllers replace the two adult human participants. We briefly
describe how the experimental setup was redesigned as a com-
puter model to help interpretation of the results; further technical
implementation details can be found in the Appendix.
We followed the evolutionary robotics approach proposed by
Beer (2003) by using a continuous-time recurrent neural net-
work (CTRNN). The change in internal activity of a CTRNN is
described by the following state equation.
τis˙i = −si +
N∑
j= 1
wjiσ
(
gj(sj + θj)
)+ Ii
i = 1, . . . ,N
σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x)
These equations describe the state changes of a continuous
dynamical system that is roughly analogous to the operation of
an actual neuronal network, where s is the state of each neuron,
τ is its time constant, wji is the strength of the connection from
the jth to the ith neuron, g is a gain, θ is a bias term, and σ(x)
is the output of a neuron given its state, which is defined by the
standard logistic activation function (range [0, 1]). The gains gi
are all set to a constant of 1 and therefore have no effect on the
system.
We acknowledge that the CTRNN controller is not a realistic
model of the brain, let alone of a whole person. In order to make
this crucial difference explicit we continue referring to a human
person of the psychological experiment as a participant (P), while
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 202 | 4
Froese et al. Imitation by social interaction?
referring to a simulated person of the model as an “agent” (A).
For our purposes we do not require a more complex model. We
selected this type of artificial neural network because it is a pop-
ular choice for evolutionary robotics (e.g., Beer, 2003; Harvey
et al., 2005). An advantage of using a CTRNN is that its dynamical
properties are well understood, at least for small network sizes. It
is a simple but dynamically universal neural network, and we are
using it as a generic continuous-time dynamical system to model
the temporal structure of the agents’ behavior. The CTRNNs of
the two agents are set to be structurally identical (i.e., all param-
eters and topology are the same), because participants of the
actual psychological experiment are assumed to be interchange-
able. Potential differences in personality type are therefore not
explicitly modeled, although the internal states of the agents will
of course differ depending on their respective histories of interac-
tion. Since A1 and A2 face each other across a 1D environment,
the sign of agent A2’s changes in position and link distance are
inverted (i.e., multiplied by −1).
Each agent’s CTRNN consists of eight neurons (N = 8) that
are fully interconnected including self-connections. The first neu-
ron is a receptor neuron receiving binary input from the agent’s
RF. The input represents a participant’s all-or-nothing tactile sen-
sation (i.e., 0 = no contact; 1 = contact). The second neuron
is an effector neuron that regulates the continuous movement
of the whole body configuration. This models a participant’s
movements with the mouse. The third and fourth neurons are
also effector neurons, which control the left- and right-button
clicks, respectively. The four remaining neurons are interneurons
without any dedicated function.
Modeling the stepwise adjustment of a participant’s link dis-
tance by means of left- and right-clicks was tricky, because it
required mapping the CTRNN neuron outputs from continuous
dynamics to a discrete domain. We chose to model a mouse click
by implementing a button activation threshold. If a button neu-
ron’s output (range [0, 1]) increases to more than or equal to 0.75,
then its button is turned “on” and produces a “click.” The but-
ton is turned “off” when that neuron’s output falls below 0.75.
In this way an agent cannot adjust its link continuously, because
the button has to be turned off before it can be turned back on.
The reason for these choices is to facilitate a distinction between
the timescales of movement and link adjustment, which should
be faster and slower, respectively. We modeled the activities of the
two buttons with two distinct neurons, rather than with two acti-
vation thresholds of one neuron, because we believed that this
might facilitate the evolution of flexible behavior.
For our model we slightly modified the standard CTRNN
equation by including some additional gain parameters. First,
the input I to the receptor neuron is multiplied by a gain ri.
This gain modulates the strength by which the internal dynam-
ics of the neuron are perturbed by input. Second, the output σ(x)
of every effector neuron is multiplied by a gain ei. These gains
modify the magnitude of the output effects, namely the range of
movement velocity and the step size of link adjustment. Third,
the output σ(x) of the movement neuron is linearly mapped
from range from [0, 1] to [−1, 1] before the gain ei is applied.
This linear mapping has the effect of letting the neuron control
both leftward and rightward motion. By adding these parameters
to the CTRNN equations, we effectively placed some aspects of
the agent’s embodiment under the influence of the automatic
optimization procedure. A standard evolutionary algorithm opti-
mized the parameters. The evaluation function measured how
well the agents were able to interact and to match their bodily
configurations. Each pair of agents was evaluated for 15 trials of
3000 time steps each with different initial conditions (for details,
see the Appendix).
The precise setup of these trials differed slightly from the origi-
nal psychological study to facilitate the evolutionary process. The
1D space was not joined into a circle, but was infinitely long in
practice given the short duration of a trial. This modification
excluded the possibility of optimizing an otherwise common ini-
tial strategy, which consisted in interacting by repeatedly going
around the circle. The size of the RFs and BOs was set to 1 arbi-
trary unit of space. Before the start of a trial the initial positions
of the RFs of A1 and A2 were set to 10 and −10 units of space,
while the distances to their BOs were initialized to D1 = −20 and
D2 = 20 units of space, respectively. D1 was then varied by a ran-
dom number drawn from a uniform distribution (range [−1.5,
1.5]), and the initial position of A1’s RF was also varied by a
random number drawn from uniform distribution (range [−1.5,
1.5]). This procedure ensured that the agents started each trial in
a configuration that was relatively advantageous for establishing
an interaction process, and yet they still had to work out how to
match their bodily configurations without knowing their status.
RESULTS
In order to facilitate the analysis of the modeling results we set the
range of random variation that was normally applied to the initial
position of RF1 to 0. Although the agents had been evolved to deal
with the additional ambiguity of initial differences in position,
here we are only interested in their ability to reduce differences
in relative body configuration. We systematically varied distance
D1 in the range [−1.5, 1.5] with an increment of 0.5, thereby
producing data for 7 representative trials.
OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS
We define “body offset” as the relative difference between body
configurations, which can be calculated summing the link dis-
tances (D1 + D2). Body offset is an indication of mutual mimicry.
An offset of 0 is a perfect match. As long as it is within the range
[−1, 1] the agents can make contact with each other simultane-
ously. Typical changes in body offset are shown in Figure 2.
The changes in body offset demonstrate that the model has
successfully replicated the main result of the original psycholog-
ical experiment by Lenay and Stewart. In trials initialized with
a non-zero body offset, the agents quickly reduce that offset
toward 0, and in the trial initialized with a body offset of 0, the
agents retain that offset. In other words, even though the agents
do not know each other’s body configurations, they are capable of
mimicking each other’s body configuration effectively.
There is another correspondence between the results of the
model and the results of the original psychological study. In prin-
ciple, participants could have stopped as soon as the body offset
was close to 0; this would have entailed a perfect score without any
need for further interaction or adjustment. However, Lenay and
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FIGURE 2 | Changes in “body offset” for seven illustrative trials. We
define “body offset” as the relative difference between body configurations
(D1 + D2). A body offset of 0 is perfect mimicry. The graph demonstrates
that the model qualitatively replicates two findings of the original
psychological study. The agents are capable of mimicking each other’s body
configuration even without knowledge of their status, and there is a
tendency for body offset to decrease all the way to 0, although mutual
contact can already be made when body offset falls in the range [−1, 1].
Stewart observed that in practice most participants continue to
interact and to adjust link distances for the rest of the trial, while
keeping body offset close to 0. Diversity of link distances tends to
increase over time. One explanation for this trend is that the solu-
tion for the task belongs to an infinite class of situations where
D1 + D2 = 0. But there must also be a motivation to continue
interacting and clicking. Participants may become entrained in
an interaction process that is to some extent self-sustaining. We
can observe a similar kind of behavior in the current model, as
show in Figure 4.
Similar to the original psychological experiment, in the model
we also find that the diversity of values of D1 and D2 continues
to increase over the whole trial. After the agents have succeeded
in reducing the body offset close to 0, which typically happens
around time step 1000 already, they continue to adjust their link
distances for the rest of the trial in a coordinated fashion. This
behavior occurs even if agents start the trial with perfect mimicry
(initial body offset = 0), as shown in Figure 3. Since this trend is
observed even though the trials are started from identical initial
conditions, including the states of the CTRNN neurons (which
are always set to 0), the increase in diversity must be related to
slight differences in the Gaussian noise applied to the movement
neuron (see Appendix). Over time this noise will affect paths
of motion, and therefore times of contact and interaction his-
tory. Fluctuations in movement can lead to onset and absence
of contact when it is not expected, and therefore may produce
an illusion of slight mismatch. Given these modeling insights,
we hypothesize that the increase in link diversity in the psy-
chological study can also be partially explained by the fact that
participants do not have perfect control over their movements
(e.g., due to various delays, inertia of arm motion, and inaccu-
rate position measurement because of mouse skipping during fast
movement).
There is another correspondence with the findings of the orig-
inal psychological study. Lenay and Stewart report that in all cases
participants were actively moving to obtain sensory stimulations,
FIGURE 3 | Standard deviation of combined link distance (D1 − D2) in
seven trials with identical initial conditions (initial body offset = 0).
Trials were run for an extended period of 15000 time steps to evaluate the
long-term trend. Values of D1 and D2 were combined into one trajectory
because the difference in standard deviation between D1 and D2 is
negligible. The trend line represents a “best fit” linear regression. The
graph demonstrates that the model qualitatively replicates another finding
of the original psychological experiment: the diversity of link distances
tends to increase throughout the whole trial, even after agents establish
mutual perceptual crossing, and also when agents are initially set to
perfectly mimic each other’s body configurations.
i.e., they were performing a kind of active perception. However,
it was found that quite often, in one-third of all trials, only one
participant engages in clicking behavior, thus changing either D1
or D2, while the other participant is only active in maintaining
the interaction. This differentiation into distinct roles is possible
because body offset is the sum of distances (D1 + D2) and can
therefore be regulated by each participant alone. A similar differ-
entiation between clicking and non-clicking roles was found in
the model, as is shown in Figure 4.
In the model the assignment of these roles is related to body
offset. When a trial starts with a negative body offset (e.g., −1.5),
A2 begins with the clicking behavior, while A1 only begins clicking
much later, sometime after the possibility for mutual percep-
tual crossing has already been established. When a trial starts
with a positive body offset, the opposite differentiation of roles
is observed. And in the case of no initial body offset (e.g., D1 =
−20; D2 = 20), no clear differentiation into roles is observed. We
note that this role division was first discovered in the model, and
only subsequently did Lenay and Stewart confirm that role divi-
sion indeed took place in one-third of their trials as well. We can
derive further predictions about the empirical data that still need
to be confirmed: (1) there is a correlation between size of body
offset and likelihood of role division, such that (2) a larger initial
offset indicates a greater likelihood of role division; and (3) there
is a tendency for role division to disappear after the possibility of
simultaneous perceptual crossing has been established. A prelim-
inary review of the empirical data revealed that these predictions
are only partially fulfilled; role-taking appears to bemore complex
in the case of human participants.
The graphs in Figure 4 reveal more trends. An agent tends to
modify the distance of its link always in the same direction, and
it retains this same direction across all of the trials. Agents also
tend to always increase the absolute link distance. More precisely,
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FIGURE 4 | Graphs of link distance D for seven illustrative trials.
Distance D measures the distance of an agent’s BO from its RF along
the 1D environment. (A) Changes in D1. There is a correlation between
positive values of body offset, e.g., larger initial values of D1 (dashed lines),
and shorter times for A1 to begin regular adjustments of D1. (B) Changes in
D2. Here the opposite trend can be observed; there is a tendency for
A2 to start modifying D2 sooner for negative values of body offset, e.g.,
smaller initial values of D1 (solid lines). A similar kind of differentiation
between clicking and non-clicking roles was found in the psychological
experiment.
it turns out that the agents have adopted a strategy that relies
on making use of the left-button only. Although this behavior
is unexpected, it is understandable because it decreases the com-
plexity of the problem to be solved by a single agent as long as
it is cooperating with the other agent. Now each agent only has
to choose between two rather than four link-related actions, i.e.,
left-click or no left-click. And if the body offset happens to be
such that an agent would have to right-click to correct it, then it
simply waits for the other agent to left-click instead, because this
amounts to the same overall change in body offset. In this way
the solution to the task has been simplified via coordinated turn
taking. On the basis of these findings we can derive additional
predictions about the empirical data: (4) once participants start
modifying the distance of their link, they tend to modify it in the
same direction for the duration of a trial; and (5) participants do
not make use of both buttons with equal probability. Again, on
the basis of a preliminary analysis of the empirical data, it seems
that human participants may not use both buttons equally, but
they nevertheless tend to use both of them.
What the single-button solution demonstrates is how evolu-
tion will opportunistically select behavioral mechanisms that will
“offload” task complexity into the interaction process, at least
under stable social situations. We can therefore hypothesize that
(6) a second button is not essential to the design of the experimen-
tal setup, although human participants tend to take advantage of
it when it is provided.
ANALYSIS OF A REPRESENTATIVE TRIAL
In order to better understand the strategy of the agents, we can
analyze more closely the time series of a representative trial such
as that shown in Figure 5. The trial is the same as that shown in
Figure 2 where initial body offset is equal to −1.5.
This trial begins with the following situation. A1’s (RF1) and
A2’s (BO2) both start from position 10, such that A1 receives
input. However, A2’s (RF2) and A1’s (BO1) start from positions
−10 and −11.5, respectively. Given that each object is only 1 unit
of space wide, A2 will start without input. A2 begins search-
ing in order to make contact with BO1 by moving RF2. But
this movement pulls along BO2, thereby removing it from RF1.
Accordingly, A1 no longer receives input and starts searching
for BO2. A2 is able to find BO1, but it is forced to maintain
this contact while compensating for a leftward drift. This drift
results from A1’s searching for BO2 and A2’s maintaining con-
tact with BO1. During this phase, A1 remains without contact and
is making no changes to D1. At the same time, A2 often makes
prolonged contact and frequently increases D2. Around time step
500 the body offset is reduced below 1 and there is possibility of
mutual contact. The interaction is now characterized by regular
perceptual crossing. Around time step 1000 the leftward drift is
eliminated, as body offset is effectively 0. After this point A1 starts
adjusting D1, and both agents continue adjusting D1 and D2 in a
complementary manner.
The agents succeeded at their task. But how did they know-
how to adjust their link distances appropriately? Lenay and
Stewart found two correlations in the data of the psychological
experiment to which participants might be sensitive: (i) a decrease
in body offset is accompanied by an increase in the frequency of
stimulation; and (ii) a decrease in body offset is accompanied by
a decrease in drift. The same correlations can be observed in the
case of the model.
However, Lenay and Stewart do not clarify the kind of mech-
anism by which these two correlations are supposed to be turned
into an effective action. Do they serve as additional input to
the explicit cognition of the participants, perhaps via integrating
proprioception and tactile sensation? Or do they constitute con-
textual “scaffolding” that implicitly guides a participant’s action?
These accounts do not require that the methodological indi-
vidualism of traditional cognitive science is rejected in favor of
a relational view of cognition (Herschbach, 2012; Michael and
Overgaard, 2012). An alternative possibility is to treat the behav-
ior of each participant as a distributed, relational phenomenon
that emerges out of the coupling of a brain, body, environment
systemic whole. On this view, we can hypothesize that the inter-
action process itself partially constitutes the regulation of the
appropriate behavior. Although it is difficult to evaluate these
possibilities in the case of the psychological experiment, in the
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FIGURE 5 | Time series of the first 1800 time steps of a representative
trial (initial body offset = −1.5). Selected variables of agents A1 and A2 are
shown in the left and right columns, respectively. (A) Position trajectories of
RF and BO. (B) Input from contact sensor (black points) and mapped motor
output (gray solid line) without gain, indicating the agent’s movement.
(C) Link distance D. (D) Output σ(x) of the effector neurons controlling left
and right button pressings. A button is clicked whenever output crosses the
threshold from less than to more than 0.75.
case of the model we fortunately have complete access to the
activity of the minimal “brains” of the simulated agents.
ANALYSIS OF THE CTRNN CONTROLLER
A preliminary analysis of the neural activity has shown that some
neurons are largely redundant. It is therefore possible to simplify
the analysis by focusing on a subset of neurons. Of particu-
lar interest is the relationship between the receptor neuron and
the effector neurons, because this is how the agents internally
regulate the sensory-motor loops that constitute their behavior.
Moreover, the agents relied on a strategy that only required left-
clicking to adjust the body offset. As can be seen in Figure 5D,
output from the third effector neuron (o4) quickly saturates, and
its role in the mechanism underlying behavior is therefore neg-
ligible. This allows us to further restrict the scope of the analysis
to the “receptor” neuron (y1), the “movement” neuron (y2), and
the “left-button” neuron (y3). Figure 6 shows how these three
neurons are related in terms of their σ(x) output state space
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FIGURE 6 | Dependencies between receptor and effector neurons.
Subsections of the neural network’s output trajectories for agents
A1 (left column) and A2 (right column) shown for the first 700 time
steps of the trial presented in Figure 5. (A) Relationship between the
receptor neuron (o1) and the movement neuron (o2). Contact occurs
when input to o1 is 1. Leftward movement occurs when o2 < 0.5;
rightward movement occurs when o2 > 0.5. (B) Relationship between
the receptor neuron (o1) and the left-button neuron (o3). A click is
made every time o3 increases from less than to more
than 0.75.
(o1, o2, and o3). We only show the first 700 time steps of the trial
shown in Figure 5. The trajectories of A2 continue to be quali-
tatively similar after this point, while the trajectories of A1 will
start to resemble the trajectories of A2, resulting in almost perfect
symmetry by time step 1500.
The internal dynamics of A1’s sensory-motor loop are rela-
tively straightforward at the beginning of this trial. After it looses
contact with BO2, it continues searching in an attempt to regain
contact. Most of the internal dynamics of A2 can be explained in
terms of a transient cycle in 3D state space (defined by o1, o2, and
o3). The timing of its receptor neuron’s on/off switching is closely
coupled with its oscillatory sideways movement. As long as input
is present, A2 moves relatively quickly; when the input disappears
because it moved to far ahead, A2 slows down until regaining con-
tact, and so forth. This sensory-motor cycle regulates A2’s clicking
as well. Prolonged contact causes the output of the left-button
neuron to exceed the threshold of 0.75, which turns the button
on and causes an adjustment of D2. Absence of contact allows
output to decay below the threshold, thereby turning the button
off again.
In order for this transient cycle in 3D state space to operate
effectively, relative timing is of the essence. Duration of contact
partially determines an agent’s velocity, and is partially deter-
mined by it, because input stimulation increases velocity and
therefore shortens duration. Duration of contact also partially
determines an agent’s clicking, because button activation requires
input stimulation. Moreover, duration of contact is also an indi-
cator of body offset. Since A1 will respond to stimulation with the
same kind of oscillatory movement we described for A2 above,
A2’s prolonged contact with BO1 must mean that RF1 has not yet
made contact with BO2, i.e., there is no mutual contact between
the agents. Accordingly, while A1 keeps searching without click-
ing, A2 extends D2 repeatedly by activating its left-button. This
process continues until a situation of perceptual crossing is estab-
lished. Once A1 begins to make contacts with sufficient duration,
it will start adjusting D1 as well (after time step 1000).
This analysis has revealed another potential factor that could
help to account for the performance of the participants in the
psychological experiment, namely the duration of contact. Like
frequency of contacts and magnitude of drift, duration is a
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property of the collective dynamics of the interaction process.
However, an evolutionary robotics model of a related psycholog-
ical study of perceptual crossing has shown that duration is not
an essential aspect of that particular experimental setup (Froese
and Di Paolo, 2011). Whether duration plays an essential role in
the current setup can be addressed by future work, for example
by setting object length to infinitely small points. For the present
debate we are interested in the more general question of what role
these kinds of properties of the collective dynamics could play in
the generation of the behavior of the individual agents.
An analysis of the phase portrait of the CTRNN controller as
a closed network reveals that a single globally attracting fixed-
point governs its dynamics (data not shown). In the absence of
any input, the network settles into this attractor after around
1500 time steps, and then remains static. From the perspective
of methodological individualism, this lack of internal complexity
should come as a surprise. How is it possible that such a single-
attractor network processes the input sequence and regulates the
output of the sensory-motor neurons appropriately? It turns out
that the dynamics of the CTRNN during an interaction are par-
tially constituted by the interaction process. The attractor shifts
its position in state space as a function of the input parame-
ter, thereby alternating the flow structure of the CTRNN state
space between two distinct attractor configurations. The shifting
pull of the attractor, combined with the non-linear constraints
of the neural dynamics, regulates the internal activity and main-
tains it as a transient. In this way the structure and activity of the
agent’s “cognitive mechanism” is partially constituted in a rela-
tional manner [for a more detailed dynamical analysis of a similar
finding, see Froese and Fuchs (2012)].
And it is not just the presence of contact that is important;
absence of contact is just as essential. More precisely, it is the rel-
ative timing of the on/off status of the input that is constitutive of
the appropriate regulation of the sensory-motor loop. Moreover,
the timing of the on/off status of the contact sensor depends on
the other agent’s behavior as well; timing of contact is an emer-
gent product of the behavior of the two agents as they interact.
It follows that an agent cannot generate the required behavior
without an appropriate process of interaction, such that an indi-
vidual’s behavior and the overall interaction process co-enable
and co-determine each other. The strategy employed by the agents
is inextricably distributed across the two agent system.
DISCUSSION
It remains to be seen whether a similarly distributed explana-
tion of behavior can be provided in the case of the psychological
experiment, and this largely depends on the analysis of the partic-
ipants’ internal dynamics. Some of these dynamics have already
been externalized through the use of a minimal human-computer
interface (Lenay and Steiner, 2010), but without a complementary
way of understanding the role of brain activity, this is unlikely
to convince hardnosed methodological individualists to give up
internalist explanations just yet (e.g., Herschbach, 2012; Michael
and Overgaard, 2012). Although there is increasing interest in the
development of a second-person neuroscience (Schilbach et al.,
forthcoming), many formidable conceptual, methodological, and
technical challenges still remain. Analyzing the phase portrait
of a participant’s nervous system is clearly out of the question,
but there may be more easily detectable markers of a distributed
cognitive process.
An advantage of the evolutionary robotics approach is that
it helps us to clarify the conceptual possibilities on the basis
of a more manageable minimal system, which is nevertheless
able to qualitatively replicate essential aspects of the empirical
data and can even predict new findings. The model can also
serve as an intuition pump for the neuroscientific analysis of
the psychological experiment. For instance, as can be seen in
Figure 5, the frequent perceptual crossing between the agents
is accompanied by a synchronization of their behavior. Starting
around time step 1500, their neural activity becomes almost per-
fectly synchronized (Figure 5D). This is understandable given the
essential part played by timing in the co-regulation of the inter-
nal dynamics of the agents’ behavior. We therefore suggest that
interactional and neural synchrony could play a similar role in
the case of human participants, thereby extending the “binding-
by-synchrony” hypothesis (Singer, 2007) to the case of social
interaction. Dual-EEG recording during imitative social interac-
tion has already provided evidence of inter-brain synchroniza-
tion, although some asynchrony also appears to be important for
differentiation of roles (Dumas et al., 2010, 2012). Interestingly,
the model confirms this finding, because the disappearance of
asynchrony coincides with the disappearance of the well-defined
roles of “clicker” and “non-clicker.”
Although it is tempting to use this correspondence to further
generalize the insights of the model to other kinds of social inter-
action, we have to proceed cautiously. Because the experimental
setup requires that there is no familiarity with the other’s bod-
ily configuration or one’s own, it is less applicable for explaining
social interaction that permit direct observation of some kind.
It is likely that there will still be a sense of pre-reflective bodily
attunement during those situations, and that this experience can
be explained in terms of the relative stability of the interaction
process (Froese and Fuchs, 2012), but other important factors
may also need to be taken into account.
More specifically, some concerns can be raised about how well
the setup accounts for the situation of neonatal facial imitation.
In terms of the model, it could be argued that such a distributed
strategy only works because it has been “hardwired” by a process
of evolutionary optimization onto a fixed experimental setup. The
argument may correspondingly apply to the original psychologi-
cal study. As a part of the experimental instructions, Lenay and
Stewart explicitly told participants to click on the left-button if
they felt the interaction drifting to the right, and vice versa. But
is this information not simply solving the strong correspondence
problem in advance? The worry is that both the psychological
study and the model support the notion of imitation by inter-
action, but perhaps only on the basis of a pre-given source of
knowledge about the situation, whether by oral instruction or
genetic encoding. It could be argued that in order for the results
of this setup to become more generalizable, it is important to
investigate strategies that can succeed without this background
knowledge.
We agree that the setup can be improved. As a first step, future
work could randomly assign the function of the two buttons at
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the start of each trial, such that it is no longer immediately clear
which of the buttons shifts the BO in which direction. In that case
their functions have to be actively learned in somemanner. A pilot
study conducted by Lenay and Stewart has indicated that partici-
pants can still succeed under these conditions. We can understand
this success because the basic nature of the solution to this corre-
spondence problem remains the same: only a situation of mutual
agreement enables a relatively stable interaction process, which
means that appropriate actions can be relatively quickly learned
by trial and error. No explicit verbal instruction (or genetic pre-
disposition, as in the current model) is necessary to learn which
actions improve the interaction. The crucial point is that this
interactive solution to the strong correspondence problem places
almost no demands on the individuals or the situation; this is
what the minimal model has shown. We can therefore tentatively
generalize the insights of the empirical and modeling studies: in
some situations the emergence of mimicry during social interac-
tion can be explained more parsimoniously by taking properties
of the collective dynamics of the interaction process into account.
From the perspective of neonatal facial imitation, this insight
could be understood as follows: an adult extends her tongue; the
neonate starts moving her tongue, while at the same time closely
observing the changing expression of the adult, until the point
when there is an appropriate response of success from the adult.
The actions of the adult person thereby serve as a kind of “mirror”
for the neonate’s own face. Regarding the possibility of this kind of
interactive regulation, it is noteworthy that most studies in neona-
tal imitation have been explicitly designed so as to rule out the
influence of interaction. Notably, Trevarthen (2005: 91–92) has
complained about the inherent limitations of this kind of study:
“By their nature, experiments in controlled laboratory situations
must limit the subject’s freedom to initiate communication inven-
tively, or to test the consequences of their response. As a rule,
Two-Way communication with the experimenter/observer is con-
trolled out.” In other words, cognitive science has often explicitly
prevented the possibility of mutual interaction playing any role,
and thereby turned the internalist doctrine into a self-fulfilling
hypothesis. The merit of the current experimental version of the
correspondence problem is that it turns this convention on its
head: methodological individualism is controlled out instead, and
it is revealed that mimicry can still take place in terms of social
interaction.
Interestingly, in their seminal paper on neonatal facial imi-
tation, Meltzoff and Moore (1977, 76) acknowledge the diffi-
culties of controlling the influence of interaction: “In reviewing
films of the preliminary work, we also noticed that the exam-
iner tended to alter the rhythm of his tongue protrusion as a
function of the response of the infant.” Meltzoff and Moore
regarded this rhythmic coordination as unwanted interference
that had to be excluded in the design of the experiments. However,
this is precisely the kind of interactive and temporally sensitive
co-regulation of behavior that we also discovered by analyzing
the model. Thus, even if the evidence for an innate and non-
interactive mechanism of neonatal facial imitation is no longer
compelling (Jones, 2009), there is still a promising possibility of
an interactive account. We hypothesize that a neonate’s ability to
engage in flexible and consistent mimicry of arbitrary facial ges-
tures constitutively depends on their engagement in meaningful
social interaction.
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APPENDIX
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE MODEL
The CTRNN and the evolutionary algorithm were implemented
on the basis of Beer’s publicly available “Evolutionary Agents
v1.1.2” C++ package2. The evolutionary algorithm was a sim-
ple genetic algorithm with rank-based selection; the maximum
expected offspring of the highest ranked solution was set to 1.2.
Due to the presence of a stochastic function in the evaluation stage
(motor noise, see below), all solutions were evaluated again dur-
ing each generation. The population consisted of 500 solutions.
Each solution consisted of a sequence of genes, which were stored
as real numbers and initialized with randomnumbers in the range
[0, 1]. After each generation, the fittest 1% of the population was
automatically copied into a new generation of 500 solutions. No
recombination operator was used in the generation of offspring
from selected parents. Instead, the genotype of the parent solution
was copied, and a mutation operator changed the value of each
gene with a small random value drawn from a Gaussian distribu-
tion with a variance of 0.1. If a mutation caused a gene to exceed
this range, then the value was simply clipped at the boundaries
([0, 1]). In order to create a phenotype from a genetic solution,
each gene was mapped to a parameter range of the CTRNN. The
CTRNNs of the two agents are structurally identical. Wemade use
of the following CTRNN parameter ranges: time constant τ range
[1, 30], weight w range [−8, 8], bias θ range [−8, 8], receptor gain
r range [−100, 100], and effector gain e range [0, 10].
Each trial was set to last 300 units of time, which were
integrated using a Fourth-Order Runge-Kutta method with an
integration step size of 0.1. The activations of all neurons were
initialized to 0 before the start of the trial. At each time step a
small random value drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a
mean of 0 and a variance of 0.01 was added to the mapped out-
put of the movement neuron before applying its effector gain.
This addition of motor noise tends to enhance the robustness of
the evolved solution. Trials are not initialized with identical seeds
of the random number generator. In order to speed up the pro-
cess of evaluation, trials were terminated early if an agents’ RF
was more than 20 units of space away from the other’s BO. Each
solution was evaluated for 15 trials. The scores of these 15 tri-
als were weighted inversely proportional to their relative ranking,
and then summed for the final score of that solution. Such rank-
based weighting helps to prevent the evolutionary algorithm from
optimizing some parameters at the expense of others.
Parameter optimization was divided into two main phases.
First, the performance of a solution was measured in terms of
the number of distinct contacts made during a trial. Note that
this is not the same as rewarding simultaneous contact, which
would require that the correspondence problem were already
solved. We tried several other kinds of evaluation functions, but
did not find them to be effective. An advantage of this initial
evaluation criterion is that it favors the evolution of robust inter-
action, and it implicitly includes selection pressure for mimicry
as well. This is because a relative difference of link distance, i.e.,
non-zero body offset (D1 + D2 = 0), introduces a drift into the
interaction process, and so the agents are forced to spend less
time making contacts and more time chasing each other. In other
words, agents that manage to eliminate the drift are able to inter-
act more frequently. This phase was terminated as soon as one
solution achieved over 100 contacts. This initial phase of evolu-
tion served an analogous function to the learning period of Lenay
and Stewart’s psychological study, during which participants were
asked to familiarize themselves with the experimental setup and
to maintain a stable interaction with each other.
For the second phase of evolution, the evaluation function
was modified in order to explicitly measure the success of the
agents at reducing body offset. Evaluation now consisted of two
distinct components. First, we measured the extent of the agents
to maintain close contact for as long as possible by dividing the
total number of actual time steps (ttotal) by the maximum pos-
sible number of time steps (tmax = 3000). As before, a trial was
terminated prematurely if an agent drifted more than 20 units of
space apart from its target. Second, we measured the ability of the
agents to match the relative distances of their BOs, i.e., to reduce
the error of absolute body offset. We summed the error over all
actual time steps, rather than just taking the final value, in order
to encourage the agents to achieve mimicry as soon as possible
after the start of a trial. Then we derived the maximum possi-
ble error by multiplying 1.5, which is the maximum magnitude
of initial body offset, by the final number of time steps (ttotal).
If the summed error was larger than the maximum error, for
instance because the agents increased body offset beyond the pre-
given initial variation (range [−1.5, 1.5]), then the summed error
was set equal to the maximum error. The relationship between
the summed and the maximum error is an indication of the suc-
cess of the agents to reduce body offset. The combined evaluation
function for the second stage was as follows:
trial score = ttotal
tmax
+ (1.5
∗ttotal) −∑ttotalt = 0 abs(D1 + D2)t
(1.5∗ttotal)
Running the evolutionary algorithm to optimize the parameters
of the model took a significant amount of processing time. In
addition, the presence of local optima in the evaluation space
made the search for good solutions difficult. We therefore made
use of a dedicated server with eight separate cores, and ran six
instances of the program in parallel in order to increase the
chances of success. Typically, it took several days for an evolu-
tionary algorithm to converge on solutions that were of potential
interest to this study. We then had to test them, to analyze
the results, and to further fine-tune the parameters of the pro-
gram before starting the next evolutionary run. It took several
months of different evolutionary runs before we finally found the
setup and solution described in this paper. Although other solu-
tions probably exist, the current solution was sufficient for our
requirements and so we did not make an exhaustive survey.
2http://mypage.iu.edu/~rdbeer/
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